Meaning of “Promissory Note” in Revenue Act of 1918—Does Stamp Tax on Such Notes Also Apply to Purchase Agreement Contracts?—It Does Not—It Applies Only to Such Commercial Paper as Shows upon Its Face the Form of a Promissory Note by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 3 
January 1923 
Meaning of “Promissory Note” in Revenue Act of 1918—Does 
Stamp Tax on Such Notes Also Apply to Purchase Agreement 
Contracts?—It Does Not—It Applies Only to Such Commercial 
Paper as Shows upon Its Face the Form of a Promissory Note 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Meaning of “Promissory Note” in Revenue Act of 1918—Does Stamp Tax on Such Notes Also Apply to 
Purchase Agreement Contracts?—It Does Not—It Applies Only to Such Commercial Paper as Shows upon 
Its Face the Form of a Promissory Note, 8 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 196 (1923). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss3/8 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
19G ST. LOtIS LAW REVIEW
inal Judiciary Act of 1789. Sec. 29 deals, among other things, with the venue
on removals and shows that the removal must be into the District court "in the
district where such suit is pending." This requirement is emphasized by sec. 53
which provides that where the district is composed of two or more distinct divi-
sions the removal shall be into the District Court "in the division in which the
county is situated from which the removal is made." In the case of General In-
vest. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, it was reasoned
that sec. 51 did not withdraw any suit from those of which the District court
was given original jurisdiction by sec. 24 but that sec. 51 merely regulates the
place of suit, its purpose being to save defendants from inconveniences to which
they might be subjected if they could be compelled to answer in any district, or
wherever found. It affords defendants a privilege which they may, and not
infrequently do, waive. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in referring to the removal
section, sec. 28, says that: "it applies to the jurisdiction conferred on the Dis-
trict courts in general, for it speaks of them in the plural. That it does not
refet to the venue provision in sec. 51 is apparent because that provision does
not except or take away any suit from the general jurisdiction conferred by
sec. 24 and because there could be no purpose in extending to removals the per-
sonal privilege accorded to defendants by sec. 51, since removals are sought
only by defendants, and lastly since the venue on removal is specially dealt with
by sec. 29. From the above reasoning it would seem that the plaintiff's assent is
not essential, in any sense, to the exercise of the right of removal, nor can he
urge that the removal be into the District Court for some other district, for it
is his act in bringing the suit in the State court within the particular district
which fixes the venue on removal. It was on application of the above views to
the case of Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company which caused the.Su-
preme Court of the United States to hold that said case was duly removed into
the District Court for the proper district, and that the motion to remand was
rightly denied-briefly, that the District Court had jurisdiction to proceed to a
determination of the cause.
* MEANING OF "PROMISSORY NOTE" IN REVENUE ACT OF 1918-
DOES STAMP TAX ON SUCH NOTES ALSO APPLY TO PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT CONTRACTS ?-IT DOES NOT-IT APPLIES
ONLY TO SUCH COMMERCIAL PAPER AS SHOWS UPON ITS
FACE THE FORM OF A PROMISSORY NOTE.
In order to properly understand the dase of Haverty Furniture Co. v. The
United States (United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, also
found in Corporation Trust Company 1923 War Tax Service, paragraph 4028),
it will be necessary to briefly summarize the facts as stated by Samuel H. Sib-
ley, J., in delivering the opinion of the court.
This was an action by the blaintiffl the Haverty Furniture Company, to
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recover of the United States the amount paid by it under the Revenue Act of
1918, Schedule A6, which lays a stamp tax of two cents per one hundred dollars
on "drafts, checks * * * promissory notes, except bank notes issued for cir-
culation, and for each renewal of the same." The instruments involved in this
-case were claimed to have been "promissory notes." They began with the words,
"This agreement witnesseth that I * * * have this day purchased from 'the
Haverty Furniture Company," and concluded with the following: "this writing
is the whole contract and no verbal statements or representations are binding."
This so-called agreement sets out at length the description of the property
nent, also providing for the retention of title, and giving an option to the
seller to rescind the contract if the purchaser should fail to pay as contracted
bot'ght, the various conditions of sale, including the terms and the time of pay-
and to appropriate the payments which had already been made to the rent and
depreciation in the value of the furniture. It was shown that some of these "con-
tracts, in stating the price to be paid, have the words, "for which I agree to
pay (so much)" while others simply "for (so much)."
It seemed to have been the contention of the United States that the con-
tract in this case was in substance a "promissory note" and that the plaintiff
had used this form simply in an effort to evade the Stamp Tax on such instru-
ments. However, the court in disposing of this contention said: "Where one
form of instrument is taxed and another not, one may, if he can so satisfactorily
transact his affairs, avoid the form that is taxed and use that which is not."
This was held in United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496. * * * As again ruled
in Isham's case, the taxability of such an instrument is to be determined by its
face alone. Outside facts are of no importance.
The natural deduction from the above statement by the court is this, namely,
that the court will look to the form of the instrument only and if it is not in
form a promissory note, then it will go no farther and will not go behind the
transaction to ascertain from the intention of the parties the latent effect
of the instrument.
In construing this statute relating to the Stamp Tax it was said per cilriam:
"What did Congress mean by the term 'promissory notes'? It did not use such
broad expressions as 'all written evidences of debt,' or 'all written obligations to
pay money.' By 'promissory notes,' used in connection with drafts and checks,
was intended commercial paper which generally throughout the United States
would be so called and recognized." The court continued: "But there must be
an instrument at least whose plain purport is an unconditional and absolute
promise to pay a fixed sum to a named or certain person at a fixed time or at
sight or on demanding, according to commercial usage." This statement further
substantiates our conclusion that the instrument must be plainly and outwardly
a promissory note, and that any falling short of such form will exempt the
instrument from taxation under the provision of the statute imposing the Stamp
Tax. The Court also states in substance that instruments such as memorandums
of sale, although they evidence an obligation to pay money in the future or in
installments, were not intended to fall within the provision of the statute render-
ing them taxable. And this is no more than reasonable. Were it not thus, com-
merce of the nation would be hindered and forced to bear a burden which, if
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carried to any length, would ultimate ry lead to a stiffing of' trade and a super-
ficial inflation of market prices of commodities.
judgment was accordingly rendered for the plaintiff.
UNPAID TAXES-RECOVERY OF SIMPLE INTEREST ON SAME IN
ABSENCE OF STATUTE-STATE RULE: EXCEPT AS TO CON-
TRACT, NO INTEREST WITHOUT STATUTE-FEDERAL RULE:
INTEREST IN ALL CASES WHERE EQUITABLY DUE UNLESS
FORBIDDEN BY STATUTE-MISSOURI RULE: SPECIAL STAT-
UTE. PROVIDES FOR INTEREST.
Can simple interest, in the absence of any statute, be recovered on a ta~c
not paid when due? "No," say the State courts most unanimously. "Yes," says:
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, March 8
1923, in handing down a decision, reversing itself, in the rehearing in the case-
of United States v. Proctor, 286 Fed. 272.
This case arose on a suit by the United States against the defendant Proctor.
to recover the amount of an income tax due since 1914 and unpaid. The de-
fendant bona fide failed to make a return of the part of his income on which the
tax in question arose, believing the same to be untaxable. The United States
had failed to comply with a section of the act providing as penalty interest for-
overdue taxes but the Government contended it was entitled to simple interest, as
upon any debt, even if the penalty was not recoverable.
In allowing simple interest on the rehearing, the Court relied almost solely
on the case of Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, a suit to recover a tax,
with interest on a foreign built pleasure boat. In referring to the difference in
the Federal and State rules, the Court there says: "The conflict between the
systems is pronounced and fundamental. In the one the State rule, except as to
contract, no interest without statute; in the United States rule, interest in all cases
where equitably due unless forbidden by statute. In one, no suit for taxes as a
debt without express statutory authority; in the other, the right to sue for taxes
as for a debt in every case where not prohibited by statute."
Practically all the State decisions, texts, encyclopedias, etc., hold to the
"State rule." The court, in Sargent v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 3Z L. R. A. 822,
says: "At best a tax is a burden, a necessary one it is true, but none the less a
burden imposed on the taxpayer without his consent and it seems reasonable to
hold that any increase in that burden by way of penalty or otherwise should be
expressly made by the power which imposes it, and that, until the legislative
will to increase the burden by the addition of interest, has been clearly expressed,
interest should not be allowed." Among the hundreds of authorities in accord
with this statement it is only necessary to mention a few such as 37 Cyc. 1165,
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 266; State v. Mutual Life Assoc., 175 Ind. 59; Rochester v.
Bloss, 185 N. Y. 42.
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